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SOUTER PASSANT, SCALIA RAMPANT: 
COMBAT IN THE MARSH 
Samuel R. Gross* † 
 
Kansas law provides that unless a capital sentencing jury concludes that 
the mitigating factors that apply to the defendant’s crime outweigh the ag-
gravating factors, it must sentence the defendant to death. The Kansas 
Supreme Court held that this law violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments because it “impermissibly mandates the death penalty when 
the jury finds that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are in equi-
poise.” On June 26, in Kansas v. Marsh, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5 
to 4 opinion by Justice Thomas. 
The genealogy of this case starts with Furman v. Georgia, in 1972, in 
which the Court invalidated all existing death penalty statutes, and Gregg v. 
Georgia, in 1976, in which it upheld three new post-Furman capital sen-
tencing laws. The received wisdom is that Furman outlawed the “arbitrary” 
imposition and execution of death sentences, and Gregg began the appar-
ently endless process of describing the requirements for the “non-
arbitrary”—and hence constitutional—use of capital punishment. The issue 
in Marsh was whether the Kansas death sentencing scheme violated the 
large, complex, and messy body of constitutional case law applying and 
interpreting Furman and Gregg. 
Justice Thomas, for the majority, addresses this in a straightforward 
manner. First, he finds that the Court has jurisdiction to review the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s judgment because it was final on the issue of penalty and 
was not supported by an independent state ground. Then he concludes that 
reversal is required by the Court’s 1990 decision in Walton v. Arizona. Fi-
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nally, he also concludes that even if Walton does not bind the Court, reversal 
is required because the Kansas statute is consistent with Furman and Gregg. 
One may disagree with the outcome or the reasoning of the opinion, but 
there is nothing remarkable about it, either in tone or in content. 
The concurring and dissenting opinions, however, are another matter en-
tirely. Justice Stevens, in a solo dissent, argues that the Court should not 
have granted certiorari to review a state court decision that, at worst, ex-
tends a protection in the Bill of Rights beyond what the Court requires. This 
is an argument he has made and lost before. The real action is elsewhere: in 
a heated exchange between Justice Souter, dissenting for himself and Jus-
tices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer on one side, and Justice Scalia 
concurring alone on the other. I will discuss the content of this exchange 
first, and then return to the peculiar fact that it happened at all. 
Most of Souter’s dissent addresses the arguments that Walton or other 
prior decisions are not controlling, and that the Kansas statute is invalid un-
der Furman and Gregg. But Souter ends on a different note: 
Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in prac-
tical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for the 
period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under 
death sentences, in numbers never imagined before the development of 
DNA tests.  
Souter goes on to discuss several studies of false convictions in capital 
cases, and concludes that given “the hazards of capital prosecution” a pref-
erence for death when “the evidence pro and con [is] in equipoise is obtuse 
by any moral or social measure.” 
Scalia responds in blistering sarcastic detail: Because the position taken 
by the dissent will inevitably provoke “sanctimonious criticism of America’s 
death penalty” from Europeans, he feels compelled to “take the trouble to 
point out”—at length—that the dissent “has nothing substantial to support 
it” and “is willing to accept anybody’s say-so” about crucial facts. 
Scalia’s separate opinions are not known for restraint, and this one is 
hardly an exception. Among others, various “professors” are conspicuous 
objects of his scorn, including yours truly. Souter’s dissent relies in part on a 
2005 article written by several students and me, on the subject of exonera-
tions in the United States from 1989 through 2003. Scalia, in response, 
describes our criteria for classifying a case as an exoneration as “self-
congratulatory,” and faults us for “inflat[ing]” the number of false convic-
tions. As evidence he points to two cases out of 340 in which he says the 
exonerated defendants were in fact guilty.  
A charitable description of this criticism would be “careless.” My co-
authors and I specifically pointed out that a few of these hundreds of exon-
erated defendants may in fact have been guilty. That follows from our 
decision to define “exoneration” by reference to the legal outcome of the 
case: it requires an authoritative decision that a defendant who had been 
convicted of a crime is released from all legal consequences of that convic-
tion because of new post-conviction evidence of innocence. We thought it 
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best to use that definition rather than rely on our own remote third-hand 
judgments of guilt or innocence. (Scalia, on the other hand—perhaps be-
cause of his position as a federal appellate judge—seems comfortable 
determining the true facts of state criminal cases.) Apparently we are ac-
cused of publishing a study in which we did exactly what we said we were 
doing. 
Scalia’s two main points, however, are more general and more important: 
• First, Scalia recycles a claim made by pro-death penalty advocates. Ac-
cording to Scalia, even if we assume many more exonerations than have 
been publicized, considering the huge total of all criminal convictions 
in the United States, “the error rate [is] .027 percent—or, to put it an-
other way, a success rate of 99.973 percent.” In other words, false 
convictions are a drop in the bucket, too ridiculously rare to worry 
about. 
In fact, the true number of wrongful convictions is unknown and frus-
tratingly unknowable. But the rate that Justice Scalia advocates is flat wrong 
and badly misleading. 
To come up with a rate for an event you should divide the number of 
times it has happened by the number of times it might have happened. 
Probably the most familiar example for Americans is the batting average: 
the number of hits by a ballplayer, divided by his number of at-bats. If you 
ignore some hits, or exaggerate the number of at-bats, a player’s average 
will look lower than it really is. Both of these problems occur here. 
Consider this example: After the first Gulf War, Desert Storm, the Veter-
ans Administration (“VA”) reported an unusually high number of cases of 
Lou Gehrig’s disease—amyotrophic lateral sclerosis—among Gulf War vet-
erans. Let us assume that 200 such cases were reported (the real number, 
thankfully, is lower—so far). One could say that this is an insignificantly 
small number, 200 divided by the 26 million veterans living in the United 
States, or 0.0008%. Of course, that is absurd. Shouldn’t it be 200 divided by 
700,000—the number of Desert Storm veterans—a rate 37 times higher? Or 
perhaps 200 divided by the 100,000—the number of veterans believed to 
have been exposed to nerve agents—about 260 times higher? 
Scalia makes this elementary mistake. He divides his hypothetical num-
ber of exonerations by all felony convictions in the United States. But 96% 
of known exonerations occurred in rape and murder cases, which together 
constitute less than one in fifty felony convictions. This is not surprising. 
DNA, the most powerful evidence of innocence, is almost entirely limited to 
rape cases. And the average time from conviction to exoneration is ten 
years, but in the great majority of felony convictions—for burglary, assault 
or drug offenses—the defendants, guilty or innocent, are freed long before 
that. So the Scalia ratio, if it has any meaning, has to be limited to rape and 
murder, and multiplied by a factor of about 50—for starts. 
Then there is the question of the numerator: How many false convictions 
are there really? We don’t know. To return to Desert Storm, the VA’s current 
figure on Lou Gehrig’s disease among veterans is hardly the last word. A 
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government report in 2004 warned that the number of cases might increase 
sharply in years to come as those veterans age; many cases will never be 
detected because of poor diagnosis or death from another cause; and some 
that are correctly diagnosed may not be reported to the VA.  
The same is true here. We do not know about many exonerations that 
have already occurred. In addition, there will be more exonerations among 
defendants now in prison, especially among those who are there for decades 
or for life, and many other false convictions will never come to light. For ex-
ample, almost all rape exonerations depend on DNA evidence, but testable 
biological samples have been located in only about a quarter of the rape con-
victions in which they have been sought. In robbery cases, where mistakes 
are probably more numerous than for rapes, DNA is almost never available 
and there have been almost no exonerations. 
While we have no meaningful overall estimate of the rate of false con-
victions, we do have some hints at the magnitude of the problem. Here are 
two examples: 
In about 25% of pre-trial DNA tests performed by the FBI, crime scene 
samples do not match the suspect. Most of those suspects are cleared, but 
how many would have been falsely convicted before DNA testing existed? 
And how many similar suspects are still falsely convicted for crimes like 
robbery, where DNA evidence hardly ever exists? Let us hope it is rare, but 
the prospect is sobering. 
Among the 7,529 defendants sentenced to death in the United States 
from 1973 through 2004, 117 or 1.6% have been exonerated. Among the 
half who have been on death row longest—those (like older Lou Gehrig’s 
disease patients) who have been incarcerated long enough to have had a real 
chance to be exonerated—2.4% have been freed. The true rate of false capi-
tal convictions, including convictions of capital defendants who are not 
sentenced to death, is probably considerably higher. 
Is that a lot or a little? That depends on your point of view. If as few as 
1% of jets crashed on takeoff, we would shut down every airline in the 
country. The good news is that the great majority of convicted defendants in 
America are guilty; the bad news is that a substantial number are not.  
• Second, Scalia argues that the only issue that might matter to the status 
of the death penalty is the execution of innocent defendants. Other false 
convictions, capital and non-capital, are immaterial. On that issue 
(which the dissent never discusses) Scalia’s view is clear: In recent 
American history, there has not been “a single case—not one—in which 
it is clear that a person was executed for a crime he did not commit. If 
such an event had occurred in recent years, we would not have to hunt 
for it; the innocent’s name would be shouted from the rooftops.” 
I don’t know about rooftops, but what about the Chicago Tribune and 
ABC News? Starting on June 23 of this year these two major news media 
ran overlapping series of stories based on a joint investigation of the case of 
Carlos DeLuna. DeLuna was executed in 1989 for stabbing a convenience 
store clerk to death in 1983 in Corpus Christi, Texas. He claimed that he had 
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been misidentified at a hurried on-the-scene identification, and that the real 
killer was a man named Carlos Hernandez. 
The prosecution argued to the jury that Hernandez was a “phantom.” 
The Chicago Tribune, however, found that Carlos Hernandez (who since 
died in prison) was real and well known to law enforcement in Corpus 
Christie. In fact, one of DeLuna’s prosecutors knew Hernandez well from an 
earlier homicide investigation. Hernandez looked like DeLuna, and—unlike 
DeLuna—had a long history of knife attacks similar to the 1983 conven-
ience store killing. He also repeatedly told friends and relatives that he had 
committed the murder for which DeLuna was executed. 
It is certainly understandable that Scalia missed this late-breaking ac-
count of an erroneous execution. The first report was just days before the 
Marsh decision, and the final installment came out after that opinion was 
filed. But the DeLuna story is only the most recent of several cases of false 
executions. 
Cameron Willingham was sentenced to death for murder by arson in 
Corsicana, Texas in 1992. In December 2004, the Chicago Tribune reported 
that new scientific knowledge proves that the testimony by arson experts at 
Willingham’s trial was worthless, and that there is in fact no evidence that 
the fire in question was caused by arson. Last March a panel of the nation’s 
leading arson experts confirmed that conclusion. In a strikingly similar case, 
another Texan—Ernest Willis—was convicted on the same sort of evidence 
and sentenced to death for murder by arson in Pecos County, Texas in 1987. 
Willis was exonerated and freed in October 2004—eight months after Wil-
lingham was put to death, in February, 2004. 
Larry Griffin was executed in Missouri in June 1995 for the drive-by 
shooting of a drug dealer in 1980. The only evidence connecting him to the 
crime was a witness who claimed to have seen Griffin firing shots from the 
murder car. This witness was a white career criminal with several felony 
charges pending against him. In July 2005, an investigation by the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund revealed that the first police officer on 
the scene and the victim’s sister both agreed that this supposed witness—
who would have stood out in the all-black neighborhood—wasn’t there 
when the shooting occurred. In addition, investigators located a second vic-
tim who was also injured in the shooting. He knew Griffin and says that 
Griffin was not in the car from which the shots were fired, but he was not 
called to testify at Griffin’s trial. This evidence led the chief prosecutor of 
the City of St. Louis to reopen the investigation of the Griffin case, twenty-
five years after the murder for which he was executed. 
Ruben Cantu was executed in August 1993 for a robbery-murder that 
was committed in San Antonio in 1985, when he was 17. In November 
2005, the Houston Chronicle reported that Cantu’s co-defendant, who pled 
guilty to participating in the crime but did not testify at Cantu’s trial, has 
signed an affidavit swearing that Cantu was not with him that night and had 
no role in the murder. More important, the only eyewitness who did tes-
tify—a second victim, who was shot nine times but survived—now says that 
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the police pressured him to identify Cantu as the shooter, and that he did so 
even though he knew that Cantu was innocent.  
None of these four has been officially exonerated. They may never be; 
there is no generally available procedure for securing an exoneration after 
execution. But the evidence that has come to light since they were put to 
death points overwhelmingly to their innocence. It might be comforting to 
believe that no innocent defendants have been executed recently in America, 
but the evidence says otherwise. We know it happens; we are leaning why 
and how; and now we know the names and faces of some of those who have 
been put to death for crimes they did not commit.  
The most puzzling aspect of this conflict is not the content of Souter’s 
dissent or the tone of Scalia’s concurrence. It is the context: Why did this 
fight occur in the Marsh case? Scalia is right when he says that innocence 
was not an issue in that case. And he’s also right when he says that the dis-
sent—a statement by four members of the Court that recent death row 
exonerations raise general questions about the constitutionality of our use of 
the death penalty—will get a great deal of attention. Given his views on the 
constitutionality of capital punishment, Scalia’s fervor is understandable, if 
not his treatment of facts. 
So why did this fight erupt in Kansas v. Marsh? Perhaps the answer has 
to do with House v. Bell, an earlier capital case last term that really did con-
cern innocence. The issues in House are dense and technical. Suffice it to 
say that the defendant, who had been sentenced to death for a rape-murder, 
assembled enough new evidence of innocence to persuade six judges on the 
Sixth Circuit sitting en banc that he should be released forthwith, and a sev-
enth judge that he was entitled to a new trial—while a majority of eight 
judges saw no constitutional problem with putting him to death. 
House arrived in Washington with an air of controversy. It was consid-
ered by the Court at five separate conferences before certiorari was granted. 
Ultimately, House won 5 to 3, with Justice Kennedy writing for the Court 
and Chief Justice Roberts dissenting. Unlike Marsh, however, the division 
on the Court was expressed as a polite legalistic disagreement over the de-
gree of deference the Supreme Court should attach to a district court’s 
decision under the indecipherable standard that the Court has laid out for 
federal courts to apply to such claims. There were no fireworks. 
Was the dogfight in Marsh a leftover from House v. Bell, which (unlike 
Marsh) actually was about the danger of executing an innocent man? Or 
were these the opening shots in a new battle—a battle over whether the 
hundred-and-twenty-plus death row exonerations since 1973 amount to, as 
the dissent says, “a new body of fact [that] must be accounted for” in decid-
ing what sort of death penalty the Constitution permits? Time will tell. 
